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Towards an Adequate Certification Policy
in Title VII Employment Discrimination
Class Actions Involving Supervisors and
Non-Supervisors
Chad Blumenfieldt
Now that America has rid itself of the morally reprehensible
institutions of slavery and segregation, racial discrimination may
find its most common remaining expression in the workplace. As
the Supreme Court has noted, "racial discrimination is by defini-
tion class discrimination."' It is not surprising, then, that plain-
tiffs wishing to remedy racial discrimination in the workplace
often find class actions to be the most effective vehicles for their
suits.' Congress sought to eliminate discrimination from the
workplace by enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VII").3 In the immediate aftermath of Title VII's passage,
many courts embraced the "across-the-board approach," which
placed more emphasis on righting the moral injustice of racial
discrimination than on a rigid adherence to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 ("Rule 23").4 To remedy racial discrimination, the
approach permitted certification of classes that did not conform
with the requirements of Rule 23. Now that the Supreme Court
has mandated in General Telephone Co of Southwest v Falcon6
that courts should only certify classes that conform with Rule 23's
B.A. 1999, University of Wisconsin; J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Chicago.
General Telephone Co of Southwest v Falcon, 457 US 147, 157 (1982).
2 See Scotty Shively, Resurgence of the Class Action Lawsuit in Employment Dis-
crimination Cases: New Obstacles Presented by the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights
Act, 23 U Ark Little Rock L J 925 (2001) (noting the importance of the class action device
for plaintiffs challenging employment discrimination).
3 110 Cong Rec S 6564-65 (1964).
' See, for example, Johnson v Georgia Highway Express, Inc, 417 F2d 1122 (5th Cir
1969) (using the across-the-board approach to certify a class despite Rule 23 concerns).
' See, for example, Johnson, 417 F2d at 1124. The across-the-board approach
adopted in Johnson enabled classes to be certified even if they did not meet all of Rule 23's
requirements. The approach arose out of a perceived need to remedy racial discrimination,
coupled with a recognition that racial discrimination is necessarily discrimination against
a class.
' 457 US 147 (1982).
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requirements,7 courts deciding whether or not a class should be
certified must reconcile the philosophical principles of Title VII
with the procedural requirements of Rule 23.
This uneasy attempt to balance procedure and philosophy is
exemplified by the uncertainty over whether or not supervisors
and non-supervisors should be permitted to occupy the same
class. If a court finds that a serious current or potential conflict of
interest exists between class members, it will refuse to certify the
class because of concerns that the class representative is unable
to adequately represent the class.' Courts often express concerns
that the structure of the workplace creates sufficiently divergent
interests for supervisors and non-supervisors that their interests
are likely to conflict during the course of litigating a class action. 9
In light of Rule 23(a)(4)'s requirement that the representative
class member "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class," ° courts must decide when conflicts within a putative class
are sufficiently troubling to warrant decertification.
Courts have reached widely divergent conclusions about
whether the presence of supervisors and non-supervisors in the
same class should lead to decertification because of adequacy con-
cerns. When the Supreme Court struck down the across-the-
board approach in Falcon," it did not provide meaningful guid-
ance to lower courts faced with decisions about whether a conflict
of interest is sufficiently serious to warrant decertification. One
court lamented the confusion that has arisen in Falcon's wake:
"irecognition [that racial discrimination is by definition class
discrimination] has left uncertain the degree of permissiveness
tolerable in applying the requirements of Rule 23 in Title VII liti-
gation, and has promoted a difference of opinion as to the proper
standard for certifying Title VII classes." 2
This Comment proposes a framework that courts can apply to
determine whether the presence of both supervisory and non-
supervisory employees in a class should lead to decertification
because of Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy of representation concerns. The
Comment summarizes the confusion that has beset this area, and
' Id at 160 ("The District Court's error in this case, and the error inherent in the
across-the-board rule, is the failure to evaluate carefully the legitimacy of the named
plaintiffs plea that he is a proper class representative under Rule 23(a).").
See, for example, Wagner v Taylor, 836 F2d 578, 595-96 (DC Cir 1987).
See id;Appleton v Deloitte & Touche LLP, 168 FRD 221, 233-34 (M D Tenn 1996).
FRCP 23(a)(4).
457 US at 160-61.
Wagner, 836 F2d at 588.
662 [2003:
661] CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
then sets out several principles that courts can apply in the fu-
ture to create more consistent and well-reasoned decisions. The
framework compiles the holdings of various courts, focusing most
extensively on the decision of the District of Columbia district
court in McReynolds v Sodexho Marriott Services, Inc.3 Courts
need not choose between the principles of Title VII and the proce-
dural mandates of Rule 23(a)(4). Applying the framework sug-
gested in this Comment will enable them to strike an effective
balance between these two important objectives.
Part I discusses the interaction between Rule 23(a)(4) and
Title VII, and explains how the Falcon decision altered the rele-
vant legal landscape. Part II explores the analysis of these issues
by the McReynolds court, and contrasts the court's analysis with
the approaches used by other courts. Part III proposes that courts
adopt a liberal certification policy in order to satisfy both Title
VII and Rule 23(a)(4).
Finally, Part IV recommends a framework courts can use to
implement this policy, setting forth specific guiding principles
that courts can use in the future. The framework recommends
that courts not decertify classes simply because supervisors and
non-supervisors are in the same class. It analyzes issues that
have concerned courts over the years, and provides recommenda-
tions about which adequacy of representation problems courts
should be most aware of and which are less troubling. Finally, it
recommends ways for courts to take a more active role in uncov-
ering conflicts where they exist and permitting classes to move
forward where they do not. By applying this framework, courts
will be able to make well-reasoned certification decisions in keep-
ing with the spirit and reasoning of Falcon.
I. BACKGROUND: INTERACTION BETWEEN
TITLE VII AND RULE 23
This Part introduces the tension between Rule 23's require-
ments and Title VII's goal of eliminating discrimination from the
workplace. It begins by describing the moral appeal of the across-
the-board approach, then explains the rationale behind the Su-
preme Court's eventual decision to strike it down. It proceeds to
explore the adequacy of representation requirement of Rule
23(a)(4) in detail. This Part concludes with a critique of decisions
" 208 FRD 428 (D DC 2002).
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by courts that have taken the Court's rejection of the across-the-
board approach to an unnecessarily formalistic extreme.
A. Falcon Strikes Down the Across-the-Board Approach
1. Advent of the across-the-board approach.
In the years immediately following the passage of Title VII,
many courts utilized the across-the-board approach to repair
broad injustices in the area of racial employment discrimination.1 4
First advocated by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v Georgia High-
way Express, Inc,'5 the across-the-board approach exhibited a
willingness to certify classes even if they did not strictly satisfy
the requirements of Rule 23.16 In recognition of the fact that ra-
cial employment discrimination suits are archetypal class action
suits," and likely in an attempt to promote the spirit of Title VII,
the across-the-board approach permitted class certification even
in cases that prompted significant Rule 23 concerns.' 8 The ap-
proach was so effective in encouraging litigation that in 1976
alone, plaintiffs filed 1,174 class action employment discrimina-
tion suits in federal district courts.' 9 The Johnson court expressed
a willingness to overlook factual differences among the class
members' claims in light of their common complaints regarding
their employer's unequal employment practices.20 This is the es-
sence of the across-the-board approach.
The across-the-board approach had appeal because Title VII
employment discrimination claims were considered an excellent
" See, for example, Johnson, 417 F2d at 1124 (initiating the across-the-board ap-
proach). See also Shively, 23 U Ark Little Rock L J at 930-31 (cited in note 2) (noting the
great deference that courts gave to employment discrimination class actions and the rela-
tive ease with which classes were certified immediately after the enactment of Title VII).
417 F2d 1122 (5th Cir 1969).
See id at 1124.
See Falcon, 457 US at 157 (recognizing that racial discrimination is necessarily
discrimination against a class); East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc v Rodriguez, 431 US
395, 405 (1977) ("[Sluits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their very
nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs.").
" See, for example, Johnson, 417 F2d at 1124 (noting that despite different factual
allegations among class members, the class should be certified as an across-the-board
class).
" See Shively, 23 U Ark Little Rock L J at 926 (cited in note 2). This stands in stark
contrast to the thirty-two filings in 1991, following the Supreme Court's rejection of the
across-the-board approach. Id.
" See, for example, Johnson, 417 F2d at 1124.
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fit with the class action mechanism.21 When Congress enacted
Title VII, it did so in an effort to eliminate race discrimination
from the workplace. 2 Specifically, it enacted Title VII in order to
prevent employers from acting because of race-based invidious
motives.23 Title VII enables plaintiffs to bring both disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment claims for discrimination "on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."24 Title VII
class actions enable plaintiffs to bring common claims against an
employer whose discrimination is more apparent when viewed in
concert with other employees. Courts advocating the across-the-
board approach facilitated these class actions by certifying
classes that may not have deserved certification under a formal
interpretation of Rule 23 .
The specific holding in Johnson indicated that any victim of
racial discrimination in employment could maintain an across-
the-board attack on all unequal employment practices alleged to
have been committed by the employer pursuant to a policy of ra-
cial discrimination. 26 In Johnson, an African-American employee
who had acted as a spokesman for other African-American em-
ployees had been discharged from employment, allegedly because
of his race. 27 The court refused to narrow the class to other Afri-
can-American employees who had been discharged, reasoning
that the scope of the lawsuit was "an 'across the board' attack on
unequal employment practices alleged to have been committed by
the [employer] pursuant to its policy of racial discrimination."28
" See, for example, Reed v Arlington Hotel Co, 476 F2d 721, 723 (8th Cir 1973), quot-
ing Parham v Southwestern Bell Telephone Co, 433 F2d 421, 428 (8th Cir 1970) ("The very
nature of a Title VII violation rests upon discrimination against a class characteristic.").
" Reprint of civil rights section of 1960 Republican Platform, 88th Cong, 2d Sess, in
110 Cong Rec S 6564-65 (1964).
' See Report by Senator Humphrey, 88th Cong, 2d Sess, in 110 Cong Rec S 5423
(1964).
" 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). A "disparate treatment" claim alleges that the de-
fendant intentionally based an employment decision on the race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin of the plaintiffs. Disparate treatment claims can involve an isolated inci-
dent of discrimination against a single individual, or allegations of a "pattern or practice"
of discrimination affecting an entire class of individuals. A "disparate impact" claim al-
leges that the defendant based an employment decision on a criterion that, although "fa-
cially neutral," nevertheless impermissibly disadvantaged members of a protected group.
McReynolds, 208 FRD at 440.
2'" See Shively, 23 U Ark Little Rock L J at 930-31 (cited in note 2) (describing the
ease with which employment discrimination class actions achieved certification in the
early years of the across-the-board approach).
6 417 F2d at 1124.
Id at 1123.
28 Id at 1124.
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The court noted that despite the differing factual allegations of
the class, the pervasive threat of a racially discriminatory policy
supplied a question of fact shared by all members of the class.29
The across-the-board approach enabled courts to certify a
class even when the class members were dissimilar in certain
critical senses. As the court observed in Wagner v Taylor, "[b]y
this technique, any case featuring a proposed class composed of
all members of a minority group connected in some fashion with a
particular employer is deemed to present common questions of
law or fact, regardless of individual variations in terms of dis-
criminatory practices suffered or injuries sustained."° In Reed v
Arlington Hotel Co,3' for example, the Eighth Circuit permitted
an African-American employee who had been discharged to rep-
resent various employees who had not been discharged.32 The
court reasoned that despite the differences between the class rep-
resentative and other members of the class, the representative
provided adequate representation because he had been subject to
the same racially discriminatory treatment as the other employ-
33ees.
2. The fall of the across-the-board approach.
The across-the-board approach, however, clashed with the
procedural requirements of Rule 23(a). The Supreme Court even-
tually struck down the across-the-board approach in Falcon,
mandating a closer adherence to the requirements of Rule 23(a).34
The Court voiced its philosophical approval for the principles be-
hind the across-the-board approach, noting that "[wie cannot dis-
agree with the proposition underlying the across-the-board rule-
that racial discrimination is by definition class discrimination."35
Nevertheless, the Court expressed concern that an allegation of a
discriminatory policy should not in and of itself satisfy the re-
quirements of Rule 23(a):
29 Id.
30 Wagner, 836 F2d at 588 (emphasis added).
3' 476 F2d 721 (8th Cir 1973).
32 Id at 723.
33 Id. See also Jordan v County of Los Angeles, 669 F2d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir 1982),
vacd on other grounds, 459 US 810 (1982) (certifying class including individuals from
various job categories).
" 457 US at 160-61.
31 Id at 157.
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Conceptually, there is a wide gap between (a) an individ-
ual's claim that he has been denied a promotion on dis-
criminatory grounds, and his otherwise unsupported alle-
gation that the company has a policy of discrimination,
and (b) the existence of a class of persons who have suf-
fered the same injury as that individual, such that the in-
dividual's claim and the class claims will share common
questions of law or fact and that the individual's claim will
be typical of the class claims.36
The Court did not hold that courts should generally refrain from
certifying classes bringing such claims. Instead, it demanded that
lower courts pay greater heed to the requirements of Rule 23 in
their certification decisions.37 It indicated, "[tihe District Court's
error in this case, and the error inherent in the across-the-board
rule, is the failure to evaluate carefully the legitimacy of the
named plaintiff's plea that he is a proper class representative un-
der Rule 23(a)." 8 Following the Court's ruling in Falcon, then,
courts need to ensure that classes satisfy all of the criteria of
Rule 23.
B. The Adequacy of Representation Requirement
One of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) is the requirement
that the representative class member must "fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class."39 The Supreme Court has ex-
plained that in order to demonstrate adequate representation,
"[a] class representative must be part of the class and possess the
same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members."4°
Courts generally apply a two-part test to determine whether a
class meets this requirement. According to the test, adequacy re-
quires that "1) the named representative must not have antago-
nistic or conflicting interests with the unnamed members of the
class, and 2) the representatives must appear able to vigorously
prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel."41
36 Id.
" Id at 160-61.
Falcon, 457 US at 160.
FRCP 23(a)(4).
4' Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 625 (1997) (internal quotations
omitted), quoting East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc v Rodriguez, 431 US 395, 403
(1997).
" McReynolds, 208 FRD at 446, quoting National Association for Mental Health, Inc v
Califano, 717 F2d 1451, 1458 (DC Cir 1983).
667
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In addition to fulfilling the adequacy of representation re-
quirement, classes must fulfill the numerosity, typicality and
commonality components of Rule 23(a).42 If these four prerequi-
sites are satisfied, then a class can be certified if the class also
satisfies one of the criteria of Rule 23(b).4
C. Judicial Overreaction to Falcon in Title VII Cases
With the across-the-board approach now a remnant of a by-
gone era, courts have become much less willing to hold that
classes fulfill the adequacy of representation requirement. While
their reasoning should conform with the policy behind Title VII,
courts are often more careful to adhere to the procedural man-
dates of Rule 23 than the philosophical ideals of Title VII.4 The
presence of both supervisory and non-supervisory employees
should lead courts to investigate the possibility that the interests
of the two groups will conflict, but courts too often engage in
analyses that make their presence tantamount to automatic de-
certification.'
In some cases, courts make broad statements that "supervi-
sory employees and nonsupervisory employees should not be in
the same class because their interests potentially conflict"' and
deny certification without further analysis.47 One court reasoned
that supervisors cannot be in the same class with non-supervisors
if they have evaluated other members of the class, even if the
evaluations have had minimal impact on the non-supervisors'
careers." Another placed an unrealistic burden on the plaintiffs
by requiring them to disprove the existence of a conflict with re-
spect to all members of the class.49 Courts should engage in a
4 FRCP 23(a) states that "[olne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3)
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class."
FRCP 23(b).
44 See Gonzalez v Brady, 136 FRD 329, 333 (D DC 1991).
See id.
4' Appleton v Deloitte & Touche LLP, 168 FRD 221, 233 (M D Tenn 1996).
47 See id. See also Fewlass v Allyn & Bacon, Inc, 1978 US Dist LEXIS 14329, *4 (D
Mass) ("Despite her good faith intentions to represent the full class, plaintiffs supervisory
position necessarily weds her to interests manifestly antagonistic to those of the class she
seeks to represent.").
See Appleton, 168 FRD at 233.
See Gonzalez v Brady, 136 FRD 329, 333 (D DC 1991) (requiring putative class to
prove the absence of a conflict amongst 1,400 different class members).
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more complex and multi-faceted analysis of adequacy than the
overly simplistic analysis engaged in by these courts. The re-
mainder of this Comment is devoted to examining the positive
and negative features of courts' analyses of the adequacy re-
quirement, then proposing a framework that incorporates the
best features of those analyses.
II. How COURTS HAVE DEALT WITH ADEQUACY OF
REPRESENTATION DECISIONS
This Part moves from the general background supplied by
Part I to the more specific issue of whether courts have permitted
supervisors and non-supervisors to occupy the same class in em-
ployment discrimination class actions. The recent McReynolds
decision exemplifies the kind of logic courts should use in deter-
mining whether a putative class fulfills the adequacy require-
ment of Rule 23(a)(4). In explaining its decision to uphold ade-
quacy in a class containing both supervisors and non-supervisors,
the court noted that decertifying a class action solely because of
the presence of those two groups could perversely reward the em-
ployer for its alleged discrimination. 0 Yet this is precisely what
many courts do when they deny adequacy without regard for the
gravity of the conflicts that exist between the two groups. This
Part explores the features of the McReynolds court's reasoning
that should be extrapolated to other courts. It then delves into
the overgeneralizations that have beleaguered the law in this
area, and concludes with an analysis of the approaches that other
courts have adopted.
A. McReynolds v Sodexho: Finding the Appropriate Balance
In McReynolds, the court certified a class composed of non-
supervisory and supervisory employees, all of whom were bring-
ing claims of racial discrimination in employment.5' The plaintiffs
sought to certify a class consisting of the following employees:
[All African-Americans who are or were salaried employ-
ees of Sodexho at any time from March 9, 1998, to the pre-
sent, and who held or sought to obtain (1) an upper-level
managerial, supervisory, or professional position.., or (2)
a job that would lead to such a position, and who have
o McReynolds, 208 FRD at 447-48.
" Id at 430.
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been, continue to be, or may in the future be adversely im-
pacted by Sodexho's racially discriminatory policies and
practices affecting promotions or advancement.52
The court held that the plaintiffs satisfied the commonality re-
quirement because they had specific, similar complaints, and
their interests were well-aligned with one another.5 It found that
the plaintiffs had made a "significant showing of a common policy
of discrimination."54 As a result of that pervasive policy of dis-
crimination, the court held that the plaintiffs also satisfied the
typicality requirement,55 which requires that "the claims or de-
fenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class."56
The court then turned its attention to the adequacy of repre-
sentation prong,57 ultimately concluding that the mere presence of
supervisory and non-supervisory employees in the same class
should not necessarily destroy adequacy.5s It noted, "[t]he holding
of Wagner has been interpreted to mean that 'the existence of a
supervisory relationship between class members could under-
mine the adequacy of the representation of the class members in
that relationship."'5 9 The court recognized the existence of valid
concerns over some class members supervising other class mem-
bers.60 Because some class members evaluated others and made
Id at 433, quoting Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification at 1.
McReynolds, 208 FRD at 443-44 (noting that despite Sodexho's decentralized deci-
sionmaking structure, the class satisfied the commonality requirement). To satisfy the
commonality requirement, plaintiffs must demonstrate "questions of law or fact common
to the class." See FRCP 23(a)(2).
McReynolds, 208 FRD at 441 (internal quotations omitted).
Id at 445 (noting that typicality was satisfied, but only for employees who worked
at the same company as the class representatives).
" FRCP 23(a)(3). "The analysis of commonality applies equally to typicality. Because
plaintiffs have made a convincing showing of a common policy of discriminatory treatment
that extends across divisions, units, and geographic regions, including those where the
proposed representatives worked, they have made a sufficient demonstration that the
claims of the class representatives are largely typical of those of the class." McReynolds,
208 FRD at 445.
"7 The defendants contested only the potential conflict of interest portion of the ade-
quacy requirement, as plaintiffs' counsel was clearly competent. Id at 446.
Id at 447.
Id (emphasis in original), quoting In re PEPCO Employment Litigation, 1992 WL
442759, *22 (D DC 1992). Subpart B discusses Wagner in greater detail.
0 McReynolds, 208 FRD at 447. Earlier in its discussion, the court cited the leading
case in the circuit, Phillips v Klassen, for the standard to be used in making adequacy
determinations. Id at 446. In Phillips, the court noted that "[cilass members whose inter-
ests are antagonistic in fact to, or even 'potentially conflicting' with, the interests of the
ostensibly representative parties cannot be bound, consistent with the requirements of
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disciplinary and termination decisions that greatly impacted
their careers, the court recognized the defendant's concerns about
a potential intra-class conflict." Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that the conflicts did not rise to a sufficient level to pre-
clude class certification.6
The court concluded its analysis by noting the danger of ag-
gressively decertifying classes because of concerns over potential
conflicts. It cautioned, "[t]o thwart a class action because of the
presence of both supervisors and non-supervisors in the class
would actually reward defendant for its alleged discrimination."6
The court reasoned that while potential conflicts might arise, this
would be an acceptable sacrifice in light of the comprehensive
remedy that the court could provide. It noted, "an injunction
against a few supervisory members of the class-who most likely
did not exert significant influence "over departmental policy-
making-is fairly characterized as de minimis relative to the
value of such an injunction in protecting those same supervisors
from epidemic discrimination."6 This analysis illustrates a court's
attempt to craft an effective class-wide remedy that conformed
with the adequacy requirement of Rule 23.
B. Wagner v Taylor: A Well-Reasoned Decision,
An Unfortunate Byproduct
Several months prior to the McReynolds decision, the D.C.
Circuit had found that a class had not satisfied adequacy of rep-
resentation in a case somewhat factually similar to McReynolds.
In Wagner v Taylor,6 the facts differed substantially enough from
McReynolds so the outcomes can be reconciled with one another.
Nevertheless, subsequent courts have cited Wagner for the gen-
eral principle that supervisors and non-supervisors should never
be placed in the same class as one another.6 This is an unfortu-
nate mischaracterization of the court's analysis.
due process to an adjudication taken in their name." Phillips v Klassen, 502 F2d 362, 366
(DC Cir 1974).
McReynolds, 208 FRD at 447.
Id.
Id at 448.
Id at 447-48.
836 F2d 578 (DC Cir 1987).
See, for example, Appleton v Deloitte & Touche LLP, 168 FRD 221, 233 (M D Tenn
1996) (ignoring the Wagner court's measured analysis and citing only the general pre-
sumption against allowing supervisors and non-supervisors in the same class).
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In Wagner, the plaintiff alleged that his employer, the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICC), discriminated against its
black professional, administrative, and technical employees above
a certain employment category.67 Wagner worked for the ICC as
an executive, but sought to represent employees at varying levels
within the corporation in a class action against ICC.6
After holding that Wagner was an inappropriate class repre-
sentative for typicality and commonality reasons, 9 the court ex-
pressed serious doubts about whether Wagner could fulfill the
adequate representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4).70 The court
voiced its general concern that "[s]upervisory employees are often
inappropriate representatives of non-supervisory employees be-
cause the structure of the workplace tends to cultivate distinctly
different interests between the two groups."7' In this particular
instance, the court reasoned that the groups' interests had al-
ready conflicted with one another.72 The court indicated that ade-
quacy was lacking because supervisors who were members of the
proposed class had been responsible for evaluating other class
members.73 Importantly, it also observed that Wagner had ac-
cused his own supervisor, a potential class member, of racial dis-
crimination against Wagner himself.74
The problem with the Wagner decision was not the decision
itself, but the broad generalization the court used to support its
ultimate conclusion. In light of Wagner's specific allegations
against another potential class member, 7 the court was appropri-
ately wary about his ability to effectively represent the class. It is
difficult to quibble with the court's ultimate resolution of the is-
sue. However, the court's general statement that "[slupervisory
employees are often inappropriate representatives of nonsupervi-
sory employees because the structure of the workplace tends to
cultivate distinctly different interests between the two groups"76
illustrates the type of overgeneralization that has plagued courts'
rationales in this area. The court cited several decisions in sup-
67 836 F2d at 581.
Id at 581-83.
Id at 590-95.
'o Id at 595-96.
" Wagner, 836 F2d at 595.
72 Id.
7:' Id.
74 Id.
71 Wagner, 836 F2d at 595.
76 Id.
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port of that general principle, 77 but a closer inspection of those
decisions reveals less support for it than the court implied. This
calls attention to the unfortunate reality that it is difficult to
summarize a court's nuanced interpretation of an issue in a sin-
gle sentence.
The cases cited by the Wagner court for its general statement
regarding supervisory and non-supervisory employees provided
less clear support for the position than the court's words implied.
The courts in Wells v Ramsay, Scarlett & Co,7s and Sperling v
Donovan79 denied class certification based on a failure to meet the
typicality and commonality requirements rather than because of
adequacy concerns.80 The court in Grant v Morgan Guaranty
Trust Co 8' did raise concerns about the ability of supervisory and
non-supervisory employees to co-exist in the same class, noting
that the defendant had raised "substantial conflict of interest
questions arising out of plaintiff's attempt to represent both black
males and white females, as well as managers who process pro-
motions and employees who apply for them." 2 Nevertheless, the
court based its decision not to certify primarily on the failure to
achieve typicality.8
The Steur v ITT Continental Baking Cos and Rodgers v
United States Steel Corp" courts also provided only marginal
support for the general proposition cited in Wagner. In Rodgers,
the court noted its concern about allowing a supervisor to repre-
sent the diverse group of employees.8 Yet it further noted, "[iut
does not follow, however, that adequate representation is lacking
in this case. Plaintiff Rodgers's position is entirely consistent
with class interests, and there is every indication that, through
Id at 595 n 119.
78 506 F2d 436 (5th Cir 1975).
79 104 FRD 4 (D DC 1984).
Wells, 506 F2d at 437 ("We conclude after studying the record that there was no
nexus between plaintiff, a foreman, and the longshoremen named in the class."); Sperling,
104 FRD at 6 ("[Plaintiffs] have not shown how their claims would be typical of the claims
of such a diverse group of employees. Only race unifies that group.").
548 F Supp 1189 (S D NY 1982).
Id at 1193.
Id ("The statistical and documentary evidence submitted by plaintiff is insufficient
to demonstrate that there is in fact a class of persons in need of protection.").
80 FRD 624 (E D Va 1977).
69 FRD 382 (W D Pa 1975).
Rodgers, 69 FRD at 389 (noting that inclusion of supervisory class members neces-
sarily leads to the possibility of a conflict with non-supervisory class members, particu-
larly in a 23(b)(2) class action).
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counsel, he will faithfully pursue and protect those interests."87
Finally, the Steur court used typicality as the main basis for its
refusal to certify, noting that, "[firom her own deposition, it is
clear that Mrs. Steur is not 'a part of the class' which she seeks to
represent. "88
Accordingly, the Wagner court's general statement was based
on several decisions that provided only questionable support for
it. It should not be surprising, then, that the Wagner court's prin-
cipled analysis89 has not resonated as loudly as its general state-
ment regarding the prudence of supervisory and non-supervisory
employees occupying the same class. It, too, has been cited for the
same general principle disfavoring mixed supervisor/non-
supervisor classes. Ignoring the Wagner court's measured analy-
sis, the court in Appleton v Deloitte & Touche LLP 9 noted that
"[sleveral courts have held that supervisory employees and non-
supervisory employees should not be in the same class because
their interests potentially conflict." 9' The first decision it cited for
this proposition was Wagner.'
C. Approaches Taken By Other Courts
Courts have adopted a wide range of philosophies in deter-
mining whether supervisors and non-supervisors can occupy the
same class. Some courts indicate that the mere presence of su-
pervisory and non-supervisory employees in the same class de-
stroys adequacy.93 Other courts take a slightly more permissive
approach to the adequacy requirement, finding that the presence
of both types of employees in the same class leads to only a pre-
sumption of conflict. In Gonzalez v Brady,' the district court in
the D.C. Circuit noted that "it is generally true that supervisory
and nonsupervisory employees are not placed in the same class
due to the potential for a conflict of interest."95 The court then
" Id.
Steur, 80 FRD at 625.
89 Wagner, 836 F2d at 595.
168 FRD 221 (M D Tenn 1996).
91Id at 233.
92 Id.
"' See id. See also Gilchrist v Bolger, 733 F2d 1551, 1555 (11th Cir 1984) ("We find no
abuse of discretion in the court's eliminating applicants and supervisors from the proposed
class.").
136 FRD 329 (D DC 1991).
Id at 333 n 12.
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implied that the plaintiffs had failed in their duty to successfully
rebut this presumption.9
Many courts undertake a closer inquiry into the particular
facts of each case to determine whether an actual or potential
conflict of interest exists among class members. McReynolds pro-
vides an excellent example. The court in McReynolds recognized
that some class members supervised others, but held that these
relationships did not create sufficient concerns to preclude certifi-
cation.9 In Hyman v First Union Corp,98 the district court in the
D.C. Circuit found that the two groups could co-exist in the same
class because although some class members supervised others,
their evaluations appeared to have had a negligible impact on the
alleged discrimination.' Additionally, because the plaintiffs were
suing because they had been terminated from employment, the
supervisory relationships had been terminated, meaning that the
conflict of interest was not ongoing.10°
Zachery v Texaco Exploration and Production, Inc '°' and
Smith v Texaco"2 provide additional examples of courts certifying
classes despite adequacy concerns about potential conflicts of in-
terest among class members. In Zachery, a district court in Texas
recognized that "some courts have found that supervisory per-
sonnel make poor representatives of employees in class ac-
tions."'0 3 It concluded, however, that because only a few class
members had been promoted to supervisory positions, and even
then to relatively minor supervisory positions, the potential for
conflict seemed relatively low under those circumstances. '°4 In
Smith, another district court in Texas held that despite the class
representatives having unique educational backgrounds and su-
pervising some class members, they could adequately represent
Id (criticizing plaintiffs' inability to provide proof of a lack of conflict among numer-
ous class members).
McReynolds, 208 FRD at 447 (noting that the fact that some putative class mem-
bers supervised and evaluated others did not mean that they contributed to the allegedly
discriminatory policies).
982 F Supp 1 (D DC 1997). Though Hyman is an age discrimination case, the dis-
cussion of class certification principles apply with equal force in the context of racial dis-
crimination.
Id at 5.
1oo Id.
185 FRD 230 (W D Tex 1999).
88 F Supp 2d 663 (E D Tex 2000), opinion withdrawn and cause dismissed, 281 F3d
477 (2002).
'13 185 FRD at 241.
104 Id.
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the class."° It reasoned that if the class's allegations were true,
the claims of the class members were sufficient to outweigh the
possibility of conflict among class members.' 6
III. COURTS SHOULD VIEW ADEQUACY DECISIONS IN RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION CASES THROUGH THE LENS OF TITLE VII
This Part proposes a general principle for resolving adequacy
concerns in cases involving supervisors and non-supervisors,
based loosely on the analysis used by the McReynolds court. The
first half of this Part recommends a liberal certification frame-
work that will enable courts to adhere to both the philosophical
requirements of Title VII and the procedural requirements of
Rule 23(a)(4). The second half of this Part considers and responds
to two likely critiques of this proposal.
A. Courts Should Reconcile Title VII with Rule 23(a)(4)
Courts should adopt a liberal approach to certification that is
nonetheless consistent with the procedural mandates of Rule
23(a)(4). As the Falcon court acknowledged, the across-the-board
approach is philosophically appropriate for Title VII employment
discrimination claims. °7 The Supreme Court rejected the across-
the-board approach because it failed to give appropriate weight to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'08 In no way, however, did
the Court indicate that other courts should ignore the principles
of Title VII in deciding whether or not to certify classes in Title
VII employment discrimination cases."'9 Accordingly, courts
should not refuse to certify a class because of adequacy of repre-
sentation concerns unless the circumstances of a case clearly in-
dicate that this is the proper conclusion.
To understand why this is appropriate, it is helpful to con-
sider the rationale for the across-the-board rule. The court in
" 88 F Supp 2d at 678.
106 Id.
107 See 457 US at 157 (noting that racial discrimination is inherently discrimination
against a class).
"o8 Id at 160 (criticizing courts for paying insufficient attention to the requirements of
Rule 23).
"o9 Id at 157 (noting continuing support for the proposition underlying the across-the-
board rule).
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Johnson, which instituted the across-the-board approach," ° ex-
plained its merit:
While it is true, as the lower court points out, that there
are different factual questions with regard to different
employees, it is also true that the Damoclean threat of a
racially discriminatory policy hangs over the racial class,
and is a question of fact common to all members of the
class."'
The court determined that justice required it to ignore Rule 23
concerns and certify the class.11 2 Although Falcon forces courts to
pay closer attention to Rule 23, courts should continue to bear in
mind the principle from the across-the-board approach.
This argument should not be misconstrued, however, as ad-
vocating a return to the across-the-board approach. In Falcon, the
Supreme Court appropriately pointed out the flaws inherent in a
basic disregard for Rule 23.113 Courts should give appropriate def-
erence to Rule 23(a)(4), and should not certify classes when su-
pervisors and non-supervisors clearly possess conflicting inter-
ests. In Allen v Chicago Transit Authority,14 for example, the
court appropriately held that a class should not be certified when
certain supervisors had made negative employment decisions
with respect to other non-supervisory class members.115 The court
cited tangible examples of these decisions, effectively illustrating
tension that had arisen in the past.1 6 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit
has indicated that unless defendants identify specific issues
where employees' interests conflict, a court need not find the exis-
tence of a conflict of interest. 7
,,0 See, for example, Mark S. Dichter and Marifrances Dant Bolger, Challenging Class
Certification in Employment Discrimination Cases, in Litigating Employment Discrimina-
tion Cases, at 24-25 (PLI Litigation & Administration Practice Course Handbook Series
No. H-586, 1998).
.. Johnson, 417 F2d at 1124 (internal quotations omitted).
112 Id.
"' 457 US at 161 (quoting the rationale in the concurring opinion in Johnson, which
noted that, "without reasonable specificity the court cannot define the class, cannot de-
termine whether the representation is adequate, and the employer does not know how to
defend").
... 2000 US Dist LEXIS 11043 (N D Ill).
' Id at *36-37.
... Id (indicating that specific class members had decided not to promote others, and
that various class members had competed with one another for promotions).
,,7 Staton v Boeing Co, 327 F3d 938, 958-59 (9th Cir 2003) (noting the District Court's
finding that defendants failed "to identify a substantive issue for which there is a conflict
of interest between two or more sets of employees").
677
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
In contrast, the court in Gonzalez relied on a vague fear of
"potential conflicts" as a basis for refusing to certify a class. It
noted, "[olver 1,400 potential class members must be protected
from such a conflict of interest, and plaintiffs provide no testi-
mony from potential class members to assure the court that
members at all levels have grievances susceptible to class-wide
solutions which effectively cut across all levels." 118 It is unrealistic
to expect plaintiffs to prove at the certification stage that there
will not be conflicts of interest among 1,400 class members. The
court's approach to this issue, forcing the class representatives to
overcome an apparent presumption against adequacy, implies
that the plaintiffs would have encountered great difficulty in ob-
taining class certification no matter how meritorious their claims.
The court had other valid concerns about typicality and common-
ality, 9 but this type of apparent presumption against adequacy
should be avoided by other courts.
B. Countering Critiques Regarding Impartiality
and Settlement Implications
Opponents of a liberal certification policy might argue that
courts should be completely impartial as they decide these types
of cases, and not give any preference to either plaintiff employees
asserting discriminatory practices or employer defendants refut-
ing their claims. Certainly, judges should retain their impartial-
ity, but they should remain cognizant of the principles underlying
Title VII. It is important not to confuse the argument regarding
adequacy as an argument applicable to all facets of Rule 23(a).
Courts after Falcon must respect the criteria of Rule 23, and
should not certify a class that contains clear conflicts of interest.
If plaintiffs in a class action cannot satisfy typicality and com-
monality, then they most likely do not have sufficiently common
interests with the rest of the class to merit certification. A court
should not certify a class in that situation; Wagner is an excellent
example of a court appropriately decertifying a class in such a
case.2 0 In many cases, supervisory employees simply do not have
enough in common with non-supervisory employees to merit their
,18 136 FRD at 333 n 12.
' Id at 331-33.
12o See Wagner, 836 F2d at 590-94 (engaging in a well-reasoned analysis of why the
class failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a)).
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inclusion in the same class. '21 If class members can overcome
these hurdles, however, concerns about the adequacy of represen-
tation requirement should not destroy the class in the absence of
a tangible and meaningful conflict. It is quite possible, and desir-
able, for courts to allow putative classes a bit of latitude in certi-
fication decisions while still cautiously adhering to the guidelines
of Rule 23(a)(4).1 22 Nothing in Falcon indicates otherwise.
Another argument against liberal certification concerns the
settlement implications of certification. Courts must balance con-
flicting concerns when deciding whether or not to certify a class
in this context. On the one hand, courts should give a great deal
of thought to the certification decision. Certification of a class is
often the first step toward settlement. 12 On the other hand, the
Supreme Court's decision in Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin1 24 in-
structs courts not to "conduct a preliminary inquiry into the mer-
its of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained
as a class action. 25
Some courts have questioned the Eisen philosophy, arguing
that certification is too procedurally important for courts to cer-
tify classes in weak cases simply because of a refusal to delve into
the merits. In In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc,'26 for instance, the
Seventh Circuit refused to certify a class, basing its decision on a
controversial inquiry into the merits.127 It reasoned that certifying
a class in a case that appeared so weak on the merits would have
shifted the balance of power unfairly to the plaintiffs. 1 28 While the
same kinds of practical considerations led the Supreme Court to
demand a "rigorous analysis" of Rule 23 requirements in Fal-
con,129 Eisen nevertheless precludes courts from investigating be-
yond the factual allegations of the parties' claims.130 Some critics
121 See, for example, id at 594-95 (noting that the class representative's vague conclu-
sory allegations failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a)).
121 Part IV sets forth a framework for achieving this balance.
12 See, for example, In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc, 51 F3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir 1995).
24 417 US 156 (1974).
121 Id at 177.
126 51 F3d 1293 (7th Cir 1995).
127 Id at 1304.
128 Id at 1299-1300. See also Szabo v Bridgeport Machines, Inc, 249 F3d 672, 675-77
(7th Cir 2001) (stressing both the settlement pressure imposed on the defendant by a "bet-
your-company" class action and the need for a preliminary merits inquiry to make the
Rule 23(b)(3) certification determinations).
12' 457 US at 161.
,' 417 US 156 at 177 ("We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23
that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit
in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.").
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feel that this approach encourages courts to make uninformed
certification decisions and then attempt to justify their decisions
after the fact, which may have dire unintended consequences on
settlement dynamics."'
This raises a valid concern, and courts should be aware of the
practical considerations advanced by the Seventh Circuit in
Rhone-Poulenc. However, courts also should not err on the side of
refusing certification at the early stages of litigation. The oppor-
tunity to modify a certification decision or to decertify a class en-
tirely provides ample opportunity to restructure the suit as dis-
covery develops. 3 2 While this may place additional strain on lim-
ited resources, the principles underlying Title VII justify close
attention from courts.
133
IV. PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE CERTIFICATION DETERMINATIONS
The McReynolds court distinguished the Wagner holding by
interpreting it as a presumption against class certification that
could be overcome under the right circumstances. 134 In certifying
the class before it, the McReynolds court reasoned that while the
presence of supervisory and non-supervisory employees in the
same class could destroy adequacy, this conclusion was not man-
datory. 5 Using principles developed in McReynolds and other
cases, this Comment now suggests a framework that courts
should use to determine whether classes satisfy the adequacy
requirement. By applying these principles, courts will be able to
adhere to both the policy ideals of Title VII and the procedural
requirements of Rule 23(a)(4).
'" See, for example, Robert G. Bone and David S. Evans, Class Certification and the
Substantive Merits, 51 Duke L J 1251, 1276 (2002) ("This kind of ad hoc-indeed post
hoc-process of justification is especially problematic in the class action setting where
certification has a potentially serious impact on settlement dynamics."); Bartlett H.
McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include an
Assessment of the Merits, 168 FRD 366, 368 (1996) (criticizing the rule laid down in Eisen
as "unsound as a matter of policy, inaccurate as an interpretation of Rule 23, and inconsis-
tent with later Supreme Court statements" as applicable to actions for money damages).
132 See, for example, Smith, 88 F Supp 2d at 678 (noting the court's ability and respon-
sibility to modify the class as necessary as the case moved forward).
' For a more detailed response to this concern, see Subpart IV G.
"4 McReynolds, 208 FRD at 447 (indicating that the class members did not allege that
other class members had discriminated against them).
' Id (quoting Pepco's interpretation of Wagner and stating that "the existence of a
supervisory relationship between class members could undermine the adequacy of the
representation of the class members in that relationship") (emphasis in original).
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The first principle lays the foundation for the rest of the
framework. It cautions courts against decertifying a class simply
because of the presence of supervisors and non-supervisors in the
same class. The second principle recommends that courts con-
sider how much actual authority supervisors exerted over non-
supervisors in order to determine the potential severity of the
conflict of interest. If class members have specifically alleged that
other class members have discriminated against them, the third
principle advocates that courts should seriously consider de-
certification. The fourth principle cautions courts against certify-
ing a class if class members are seeking remedies that conflict
with one another. In contrast, the fifth principle advises courts
not to give undue weight to the concern that class members might
have competed with each other for promotions.
The sixth and seventh principles contain advice that courts
can use as they manage employment discrimination class actions.
The sixth principle recommends that courts elicit testimony from
various class members while deciding whether to certify the
class. Finally, the seventh principle urges courts to consider al-
ternatives, such as conditional certification or narrowing the
class, if conflicts between supervisors and non-supervisors render
the class impracticable. Applied together, these principles offer
courts a comprehensive framework to determine when supervi-
sory and non-supervisory employees can occupy the same class.
A. Mere Presence Insufficient to Decertify
The mere presence of supervisory and non-supervisory em-
ployees in the same class should not destroy adequacy. The Wag-
ner court wisely asserted that if supervisory and non-supervisory
employees are in the same class, this may destroy adequacy. 13,
The presence of members of both groups should raise adequacy
concerns about conflicts of interest, as essentially every court ad-
dressing the issue has recognized. Supervisory employees in a
class action with non-supervisory employees ostensibly owe a
dual allegiance, to their employer on one hand and to the non-
supervisory class members on the other. Their presence in a class
with non-supervisory employees should cause courts to investi-
gate further to determine whether a conflict of interest exists.
"' Wagner, 836 F2d at 595.
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This concept is wholly uncontroversial, since all courts closely
scrutinize adequacy under these circumstances. 137
Courts should not, however, decertify a class due to adequacy
concerns absent specific reasons to do so. The mere presence of
both supervisory and non-supervisory employees in the same
class should be insufficient to destroy adequacy. When the Su-
preme Court struck down across-the-board certification, it did so
because of procedural, not philosophical, concerns. 38 Accordingly,
courts should continue to promote Title VII's policies against ra-
cial discrimination.3 9 Courts would therefore act consistently
with Title VII by only decertifying classes if the class presents
real and substantial concerns about adequacy. Sweeping gener-
alizations that pay little attention to the specific facts of an indi-
vidual case should not be used to reject adequacy. Hence, the
court in Appleton, which simply cited the conclusory statement
that "supervisory employees and non-supervisory employees
should not be in the same class because their interests potentially
conflict,"'" should have engaged in a more fact-specific analysis
instead of relying on a sweeping generalization.
Requiring courts to point to a reason beyond the mere pres-
ence of supervisory and non-supervisory employees in the same
class may alter the determination of whether the adequacy re-
quirement is satisfied. In Smith, for example, the court indicated
that it would not infer the existence of a conflict of interest from
the mere presence of both types of employees in the same class."'
It noted, "[t]he court cannot find any antagonistic interests be-
tween class members and their representatives.""'
In contrast, the court in Gonzalez placed the onus on the
plaintiffs to prove that no conflict existed, and accordingly, found
adequacy lacking." It criticized the class for not assuring the
court that no conflicts would arise amongst the over 1,400 poten-
tial class members." Absent a tangible rationale to support the
existence of a conflict-which the court did not provide-the court
37 See, for example, id.
3' Falcon, 457 US at 157, 160 (noting that although the principles of the across-the-
board approach were sound, its fatal flaw was a lack of attention to Rule 23's require-
ments).
.39 Title VII was intended primarily to prevent racial discrimination in the workplace.
See 110 Cong Rec S 5423 (Mar 17, 1964).
'40 168 FRD at 233, citing Wagner, 836 F2d at 595, among other cases.
... Smith, 88 F Supp 2d at 678.
42 Id.
143 Gonzalez, 136 FRD at 333-34.
144 Id at 333 n 12.
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in Gonzalez should not have required the plaintiffs to elicit testi-
mony from such a large group in order to refute the possibility of
a conflict.
The McReynolds court engaged in a more robust analysis.
The court noted, "[tihe mere fact that some putative class mem-
bers were involved in the supervision and rating of other class
members does not mean that the supervising class members per-
petuated or contributed to any of Sodexho's alleged discrimina-
tory policies."'" The court in Staton v Boeing Co 46 used similar
reasoning, noting that the determination of whether a class con-
tains unworkable conflicts is context-specific, and that the work-
force structure concerns in that case did not preclude a finding of
adequacy. 147 The Staton court, like the McReynolds court, held
that despite the presence of supervisors and non-supervisors in
the same class, the class fulfilled the adequacy requirement.4
B. Actual Authority
Courts should inquire whether supervisors exerted actual
authority over non-supervisory class members. A proper inquiry
into whether supervisors and non-supervisors can be in the same
class should include an investigation into the actual authority
that the supervisors exerted over the non-supervisors. As one
court noted, "the potential conflict is greatest when one class
member has, as supervisor, evaluated another class member who
now challenges the evaluation system."149 Indeed, if the supervi-
sors have extensive authority to evaluate employees and then
make promotion decisions based on those evaluations, then a su-
pervisor in a class with non-supervisors would have a potentially
serious conflict of interest. She would potentially have to chal-
lenge the decisions that she made in the context of her job in or-
der to advance the plaintiffs' case. However, in a more centralized
decisionmaking structure, where immediate supervisors have less
control over employee evaluation and promotion, the potential
conflict would be lessened significantly.
The McReynolds court effectively analyzed this issue. As dis-
cussed above, the court declined to find a lack of adequacy on the
basis that some class members had supervised and evaluated
1 McReynolds, 208 FRD at 447.
146 327 F3d 938 (9th Cir 2003).
141 Id at 958-59.
148 Id.
"' Zachery, 185 FRD at 241.
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other putative class members. 5 ° The court reasoned that while
these evaluations created concerns about possible conflicts, the
need for a class action outweighed these concerns in the instant
case. Because the supervisors in the class "most likely did not
exert significant influence over departmental policy-making," it
found that the value of protecting the supervisors from "epidemic
discrimination" superseded the adequacy concerns.'51 Similarly, in
Hyman, the court noted that "[pilaintiffs have presented credible
evidence that even if the evaluations had any impact on the ter-
mination decisions, it was a negligible impact."1 2
This reasoning sharply contrasts with the rationale used in
the Appleton case. There, the court engaged in the kind of over-
generalization that is too often involved in racial discrimination
cases:
[M]embers of the proposed class who are supervisors have
likely been responsible for evaluating the performances of
other members of the class-evaluations these nonsuper-
visory personnel may challenge as discriminatory. For ex-
ample, one of the potential class members who has filed an
affidavit.., raises a discriminatory evaluation claim. De-
fendant indicates, however, that one of the supervisors
who evaluated [that class member] was African American,
and himself potentially a member of the proposed class.153
This type of argument assumes that whenever some class mem-
bers evaluate others, the class representative cannot adequately
represent the class. This assumes too much. Evaluations among
class members raise the specter of a conflict, and may be the pri-
mary factor in decertifying classes, but courts should remain
faithful to the precepts of Title VII and not give this undue cre-
dence. Courts should deny adequacy only if the evaluations raise
sufficient concerns over conflicts to justify the decision, not sim-
ply because some class members supervised others.
McReynolds, 208 FRD at 447.
Id at 447-48.
... 982 F Supp at 5. See also Zachery, 185 FRD at 241 (finding that although some
class members evaluated others, the potential for conflict was "somewhat limited under
the circumstances" because the great majority of the class was situated similarly to one
another).
' Appleton, 168 FRD at 233.
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C. Specific Allegations Are Troubling
Specific allegations of discrimination by some class members
against other class members should generally destroy adequacy.
The McReynolds court found it notable that the "plaintiffs [had]
not alleged discriminatory treatment by other potential class
members with respect to promotions."54 Similarly, in certifying
the class in Hyman, the court noted that no plaintiffs had alleged
any discrimination by other plaintiffs.'
In contrast, the Wagner court buttressed its conclusion
against adequacy by noting that the named plaintiff was alleging
that his own supervisor, a potential class member, had discrimi-
nated against him. 56 Specific allegations such as these place the
supervisor in the untenable position of simultaneously having to
defend his specific actions while challenging the general actions
of the company that employs him. They should send a warning
that serious conflicts of interest are more likely to arise if the
class is certified.
D. Conflicting Remedies Are Troubling
Courts should inquire whether a potential remedy would be
antagonistic to the interests of some class members. Outside of a
formalistic adherence to Rule 23's requirements, it would seem
that courts' primary concerns over adequacy center around a fear
that the remedy granted to the class will be antagonistic to the
interests of particular class members. If class members who have
potential conflicts are not aggrieved by the remedy, however, it is
more difficult to be concerned with harm done to them. In Con-
flict and Dissent in Class Actions: a Suggested Perspective,' Pro-
fessor Garth addresses this type of concern by distinguishing
"one-shot" remedies, such as injunctions prohibiting enforcement
of an unconstitutional law or practice, from structural remedies,
such as antidiscrimination programs. He argues that courts
should be more cautious when providing one-time remedies,
which some class members may be forced to accept reluctantly,
than structural remedies, which by necessity involve greater ju-
208 FRD at 447.
982 F Supp at 5.
156 836 F2d at 595.
Bryant G. Garth, Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested Perspective, 77
Nw U L Rev 492 (1982).
' Id at 526-27.
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dicial participation and long-term attention to dissenters within
the class.5 9
The Supreme Court reasoned in East Texas Motor Freight
System, Inc'so that when putative class members disagree over
the type of desired remedy, this should raise serious concerns
over a potential conflict of interest. 16' The Court found a "conflict
between the vote by members of the class rejecting a merger of
the city- and line-driver collective- bargaining units, and the de-
mand in the plaintiffs' complaint for just such a merger."162 It
raises clear concerns over adequacy of representation when one
set of class members is agitating for relief that another set of
class members opposes. In East Texas, the Court was justifiably
concerned that the class representatives could not simultaneously
represent the interests of one group that wanted a merger to suc-
ceed and another that wanted the same merger to fail. 16'
The court in Lott v Westinghouse Savannah River Co's used
similar reasoning to find a lack of adequacy in a racial discrimi-
nation suit.'6' Because some putative class members hoped to be
placed into the same type of positions that others hoped to be re-
moved from,"6 the court found a serious conflict in the plaintiffs'
remedial desires.' Other courts have also found that remedial
disagreements create conflicts sufficient to destroy adequacy. '68
Accordingly, if class members request remedies that seriously
conflict with one another, courts should question whether certifi-
cation is advisable.
"' Id at 527.
60 431 US 395 (1977).
"' Id at 405.
162 Id.
163 Id.
200 FRD 539 (D SC 2000).
... Id at 562.
66 Varying levels of willingness to work in radiologically sensitive areas created the
discrepancy.
167 Id.
" See, for example, Broussard v Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc, 155 F3d 331,
339 (4th Cir 1998) ("Pursuing a damage remedy that was at best irrelevant and at worst
antithetical to the long-term interests of a significant segment of the putative class added
insult to the injury of abandoning the only remedy in which that segment (the EDP fran-
chisees) was interested. Plaintiffs' strategy thus illustrates the error of allowing them to
sue on behalf of 'all' Meineke franchisees.").
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E. Competition for Promotions Is Not Troubling
Courts should not deny adequacy because putative class
members have competed with each other for promotions. Too
many courts engage in the misguided logic that adequacy should
be denied because class members may compete with each other
for the desired remedy, a promotion. In Allen v City of Chicago,69
for example, the court noted that "[allthough the class members
and the named plaintiffs allegedly were denied the position or
promotion on the basis of race, conflict arises in that multiple
class members would request reinstatement to the same posi-
tion."170 This type of argument has been used by other courts as
well,17 but it ignores the philosophy of Title VII and is of doubtful
merit. The argument seems to proceed along these lines: a named
plaintiff is incapable of challenging discriminatory practices by
an employer because if the suit were successful, the plaintiffs
could not possibly all advance at once.
One court in a gender discrimination case strongly criticized
the presumption that class members who competed with each
other for promotions should consequently be prevented from oc-
cupying the same class. 72 It noted, "[tihat absurd proposition
would of course doom almost every class action charging dis-
crimination in promotion-a drastic rewrite of the law in this
area."173 Indeed, it seems strange to argue that most class mem-
bers would prefer to see discriminatory practices continue instead
of halting such practices and obtaining relief from the employer.
Even if an individual could not advance to a better position
within the company himself, ridding the company of discrimina-
tion would facilitate the upward mobility of similarly situated
individuals in the future. The alternative would make discrimi-
nation much more feasible for employers "because class-
discriminatory promotion would be cost-free."' 74 It is quite cynical
to suggest that if employees were forced to choose between con-
169 828 F Supp 543 (N D I1 1993).
Id at 553.
171 See, for example, Tooley v Burger King Corp, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 4525, *8 (N D Ill)
(finding significant concerns with adequacy because plaintiffs would have to compete with
one another for promotions).
'71 See Meiresonne v Marriott Corp, 124 FRD 619 (N D I1 1989). See also McReynolds,
208 FRD at 447 n 31.
171 Meiresonne, 124 FRD at 625 (emphasis in original).
174 Id.
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tinued discrimination or an end to discrimination but no immedi-
ate personal relief, they would opt for continued discrimination.
F. Elicit Testimony
If supervisory and non-supervisory employees co-exist in a
suit, courts should encourage both parties to elicit testimony from
representative group members. Certainly, this principle must be
balanced with concerns about delving into discovery at the certifi-
cation stage, but these concerns may be overcome. Parties may
present valid concerns regarding the hardships of obtaining input
from concerned class members prior to discovery. If a court finds
these concerns well-founded, it may create alternative solutions
to the issue, such as certifying a class but then holding an addi-
tional certification hearing several months later to re-examine
potential conflicts.
In assessing whether a conflict of interest exists between
class members, courts frequently consider the testimony of the
members whose interests may conflict. 75 One commentator has
advocated that judges take a more proactive approach, whereby
the court seeks spokespeople for the various positions of the dif-
ferently situated class representatives. 7 6 Creative solutions such
as this would allow courts to more accurately assess the possibili-
ties for certification while avoiding a detailed analysis into the
merits. If the defendants identify a substantial conflict of inter-
est, and support their claim with testimony from supervisory em-
ployees, courts should view this as powerful evidence of a conflict.
If a conflict of interest truly does exist, defendants should be able
to find at least one or two putative class members who oppose the
suit. In the event that defendants cannot locate individuals to
elucidate the reasons for a potential conflict, courts should be
more skeptical that such a conflict exists.
G. Alternatives to Decertification
If conflicts make the class infeasible as constituted, courts
should strongly consider conditionally certifying the class or nar-
rowing it rather than decertifying the class. The Falcon court al-
... See, for example, McReynolds, 208 FRD at 447.
"' See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv L Rev 1, 21, 26-27
(1979) (reasoning that different class members will seek different relief, and judges should
seek out interested parties to facilitate a more nuanced understanding of the class's de-
sires).
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luded to the fact that courts have the ability to amend their certi-
fication decisions in light of additional information. "Even after a
certification order is entered, the judge remains free to modify it
in the light of subsequent developments in the litigation."177 In-
deed, Rule 23(c)(1) permits courts to alter their certification deci-
sions following the initial certification decisions.1 78 When a court
is concerned that potential conflicts of interest may arise, the
court should therefore certify a class conditionally, with the un-
derstanding that if potential conflicts arise, the class will be ei-
ther narrowed or decertified.
Opponents of this principle will argue that in practice, the
initial certification decision is unlikely to be overturned or modi-
fied. A 1995 Federal Judicial Center study of class actions in four
federal districts found that motions to decertify or reconsider a
certification decision were filed in only 15 percent of the 152 certi-
fied class actions studied. 79 Of those cases, judges modified or
reversed their certification decisions on only three occasions."'o
The fact that certification decisions are not often overturned,
however, does not indicate that courts cannot alter their ap-
proaches in the future. If a court has substantial concerns about
conflicts arising as a case moves forward, it can arrange an addi-
tional certification hearing six months after the conditional certi-
fication to re-evaluate the original decision.18 ' The prospect of an
additional certification hearing would alter the settlement dy-
namics between the parties, reducing the certainty that the class
would move forward.
Courts faced with a class bringing a meritorious claim but
beset by conflicts between supervisors and non-supervisors
should consider narrowing the class instead of refusing certifica-
tion. In Morgan v United Parcel Service of America, Inc,'8s for ex-
ample, the court felt that the class representative would provide
adequate representation for all center managers, but not lower-
177 Falcon, 457 US at 160.
171 "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order
under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the
decision on the merits." FRCP 23(c)(1).
... Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper, and Robert J. Niemic, Empirical Study of
Class Actions in Four Federal District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules at 35 (Federal Judicial Center 1996).
Id at 175.
SI See FRCP 23(c)(1).
169 FRD 349 (E D Mo 1996).
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level employees.1 Rather than reject certification, the court nar-
rowed the class to eliminate what it felt were overwhelming con-
flicts.18 Wherever possible, courts should take this step, rather
than refusing to certify an entire class. Narrowing classes, how-
ever, should still be generally disfavored, as it is usually prefer-
able to certify a larger class in order to accommodate all those
who may have grievances. Larger classes promote judicial econ-
omy, and help ensure that subclasses are not decertified for lack
of numerosity.
Whether a court decides to certify a class outright, certify it
conditionally, or certify a narrower class than the proposed class,
it should actively monitor the class following the initial certifica-
tion decision. The liberal approach to certification recommended
in this Comment could result in classes moving forward despite
actual conflicts of interest unless courts are willing to re-evaluate
the class composition following discovery. In Smith, the court
noted its continuing obligation to monitor the class to ensure that
adequacy was preserved.18 After finding no present conflict of
interest, the court recognized that it had the "continuing author-
ity and the ongoing obligation to adjust the class representatives
to serve the interests of the class members if it becomes neces-
sary."' 8 This type of continued vigilance would provide defen-
dants with an additional opportunity, post-certification, to chal-
lenge adequacy. If true conflicts do exist, discovery will likely un-
cover them. This approach would allow courts to presume ade-
quacy upon a sufficient presentation of evidence, then re-evaluate
the finding based on further information unearthed during dis-
covery. The approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's di-
rective that courts should not inquire into the merits of the case
during the certification stage. It also increases the likelihood that
certification decisions will conform with Rule 23(a)(4).
CONCLUSION
When the Johnson court initiated the across-the-board ap-
proach, a concurring opinion prophetically foreshadowed difficul-
ties for Title VII litigation. The court feared that without the
across-the-board approach, "[o]ver-technical limitation of classes
" Id at 357.
i Id at 358.
88 F Supp 2d at 678.
I,6 Id.
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by the district courts will drain the life out of Title VII." 87 After
the Supreme Court struck down the across-the-board approach in
Falcon,88 too many courts allowed this prediction to become real-
ity.1" The McReynolds court struck a blow for Title VII, offering
reasoning that other courts should use in the future to determine
whether putative classes fulfill the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4)
and Title VII.' 9° Hopefully, courts in the future will adopt the
principles developed in this Comment, which are based largely on
the McReynolds opinion. A liberal certification policy based on
this framework would enable courts to limit racial discrimination
while adhering to the procedural requirements of Rule 23. If
courts adopt this policy, they would go a long way toward restor-
ing the vitality that Title VII employment discrimination class
actions may have lost.
187 Johnson, 417 F2d at 1126 (Godbold concurring).
See Falcon, 457 US at 160-61.
See, for example, Appleton, 168 FRD at 233.
" 208 FRD 428.

